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Abstract 
Since Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) may exhibit different structures and emergent behaviours during different 
operational phases, while also being safety critical, it is useful to perform systematic safety analyses tightly relying 
on the functional and components topologies of such systems. Our proposal is to perform FMEA and FTA analyses 
as soon as possible in the CPS design process in order to identify and mitigate the risks related to some safety critical 
structures and behaviours. Thus, these preliminary analyses enable to propose relevant design modifications and 
improvements such as optional or additional redundancies, components repairability capabilities or relevant control 
strategies, taking into account the complexity and the potential variability of the structure and the behaviour of the 
systems. This work derives from previous MBSE (Model-Based System Engineering) and MBSA (Model Based 
Safety Analysis) integration studies, performed during the early phases of the design of safety critical mechatronic 
systems, including interconnection components and multi-physical interactions. It relies mainly on M2M (Model to 
Model) and M2T (Model to Text) transformations and appropriate SysML metamodeling. The proposed CPS safety 
analysis methodology is illustrated using an aeronautic industrial case study.
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1. Introduction 
CPS (Cyber-Physical Systems) are cross-domain systems that rely on mechatronics at the interface between the 
physical world, mainly dealing with energy and material, and the cyber world, mainly dealing with data, information 
and knowledge. They include actuators and sensors, along with embedded systems for real-time computing, 
connection to computing resources and human-machine interfaces, as proposed in Fig. 1. Rather than to oppose 
mechatronics and CPS as usually studied, this scheme highlights the integration of numerous mechatronic devices in 
a CPS structure, thus implicitly generating CPS related requirements to be taken into account when designing a 
mechatronic subsystem. 
Fig. 1. Partial view of the interface between cyber and physical worlds 
Most CPS are also complex systems with potentially dynamically variable topology, meaning that some 
components, being physical, cyber or interfaces between physical and cyber worlds, may appear or disappear from the 
structure of the system. Consequently, the system may exhibit new emergent behavior, thus needing some careful 
safety analyses for safety critical CPS. Our main goal is to deal with safety requirements as soon as possible in the 
design process of complex systems, with an integrated MBSE-MBSA framework that allows the generation of safety 
artifacts, such as FMEA and FTA, directly analyzing the topology of the system. Thus, even with a varying topology, 
it may be possible to perform safety analyses that encompass most of the dysfunctional behavior of CPS. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, a short overview of related works about the integration of safety analysis 
within a SysML-based systems engineering approach is given in section 2. Then, the proposed integrated process, 
called SafeSysE, is detailed in section 3, and illustrated with a FCS (Flight Control System) use case in section 4. 
Finally, the paper is concluded in section 5 with a discussion and some future works. 
2. Related works 
CPS and mechatronic systems similarities and differences are highlighted by Guérineau et al1, and a metrics-based 
approach is proposed in order to define the best relevant design methodology. Among existing design methodologies 
relevant for complex systems, merging MBSE and MBSA processes have been studied in many different ways such 
as sharing a common SE-SA (Systems Engineering – Safety Analysis) safety data base2,3, a more simple strategy that 
consists in only sharing safety information4, or a more elaborated one in performing direct SE-SA automated models 
transformations5,6. Taking into account the variability of the topology of a CPS when performing safety analysis, even 
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if it is limited to redundancy policies, has been addressed by Piriou et al7. Since embedded systems are considered as 
parts of CPS, an integrated MBSE-MBSA framework will have to deal with the combination of hardware and software 
components with mixed criticality8. Finally, CPS obviously include mechatronic interfaces between the cyber world 
and the physical world. Thus, an extended mechatronic system modeling may be useful in order to deal with 
interconnection components (cables, data bus, mechanical links, etc.) and multi-physic undesired interactions9, such 
as thermal fields, vibrations propagation and electromagnetic interferences. 
3. An integrated MBSE-MBSA framework for complex systems design 
When designing a new complex system, system architects rely on modeling and simulation in order to define 
relevant architectures regarding the expected behavior expressed by the stakeholders. Thus, MBSE (Model-Based 
Systems Engineering) is almost compulsory in the design phase and requires the use of complementary languages and 
tools such as SysML and Modelica, together with associated methodologies that can ensure the whole consistency 
among different kind of modeling and simulation. Usually, safety experts are tardily associated to the architecture 
design process, which makes their recommended design changes very costly. Moreover, as system architects and safety 
experts use different modeling tools, the consistency is not ensured among their respective models, and design 
information and data are not well shared between them. In order to avoid this error prone design workflow, we propose 
a thorough integration of MBSE and MBSA (Model-Based Safety Assessment) processes. The four main tasks to be 
performed synergistically are shown in Fig. 2. 
MBSE relies on two main tasks. Firstly, the definition of the requirements with a black-box analysis and relevant 
architectures definition with a white-box synthesis, that can be performed using SysML language. Secondly, a multi-
domain and 3D multiphysics analysis of the behavior induced by the previously defined architectures in order to 
compare and quote them, that can be performed using Modelica language. 
MBSA, on the other hand, mainly consists in the following tasks. Firstly, a safety analysis based on complementary 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), that must rely on the system modeling 
previously defined with MBSE. Secondly, tolerances and uncertainties are evaluated in order to deal with the 
robustness of the design, but also with fault detection and diagnostic. 
Fig. 2. MBSE and MBSA synergistic tasks 
Fig. 3. shows a process, called SafeSysE, that allows performing tightly systems engineering and safety analysis 
tasks with 6 main steps: 
• Requirements Definition and Analysis, 
• Functional Structure Definition, 
• Functional Risk Assessment, 
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• Logical Structure(s) Definition, 
• Component Level Risk Assessment, 
• Fault Propagation and Reliability Assessment 
Fig. 3. SafeSysE integrated MBSE and MBSA process 
This proposal relies on a SysML-based modeling. Safety artifacts are generated analyzing the functional and 
components-based topologies of the system enclosed in activity diagrams and internal block diagrams (IBD) 
respectively.
4. A CPS scenario: the Flight Control System (FCS) 
In order to briefly outline our proposal, an aeronautic case study is chosen (see Fig. 4). 
Figure 4: FCS control surfaces (Airbus A380) 
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On a modern aircraft, the trajectory and the attitude are controlled using a flight control system (FCS) made up of 
redundant hydraulic electrical energy networks, actuators to adjust control surfaces (ailerons, etc.) incidences, cross-
monitored redundant computers to implement the control-command strategies, data networks, pilots and auto-pilot 
human-system interfaces, etc. As a whole, such a system is a CPS with many redundancies that may impact the 
topology at a given moment. The context and external actors interacting with the FCS are represented in a SysML 
block definition diagram (BDD) shown on Fig. 5. 
Fig. 5. FCS context diagram 
Fig. 6. FCS functional architecture 
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A thorough functional breakdown of the FCS system allows functional architecture modeling with data and energy 
flows being clearly established between functions. The SysML activity diagram (see Fig. 6) displays the different 
functions performed by the FCS. 
Relying on the functional topology of the system, as expressed in the previous activity diagram, a partially filled 
FMEA table is automatically generated and provided to the safety expert (see Fig. 7). The generated FMEA contains 
the list of the system functions contained in the system model (activity diagrams), and, for each function, it provides 
predefined failure modes, input and output flows in order to help the expert to determine the related potential causal 
factors, upstream and downstream functions to help the expert to identify the immediate effects. The FMEA table is 
then completed by the safety expert. Recommended actions resulting from this analysis shall be taken into account 
with new safety requirements. Thus, a new adapted functional architecture can be defined with respect to these new 
requirements. 
Fig. 7. Example of automatically generated FMEA 
Once the functional architecture is defined, the different functions are allocated to components (see Fig. 8) and 
some components-based architectures are defined (see Fig. 9) with SysML Internal Block Diagrams (IBD). 
For a given feared event on one of the system output, a graph-traversal analysis is performed in order to build a 
generic fault-tree (see Fig. 10). It allows safety experts to analyze qualitatively and quantitatively the dysfunctional 
behavior with relevant recommended actions if necessary. 
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Fig. 8. Functions allocation to components (extract) 
Fig. 9. FCS components architecture (extract) 
Fig. 10. Generic automatically generated FT 
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5. Discussion and future works 
Since safety-critical CPS exhibit complex structures and may be subject to topological changes, an integrated 
model-based system & safety design process must handle these particularities. Having proposed an automatic 
generation of safety artifacts such as FMEA and FTA, based on the functional and components topologies of the 
system, any change in these topologies causes induced modifications in FMEA and FTA. 
Thus, safety experts and systems architects are provided with means to semi-automatically explore a wide range of 
architectures combinations in order to encompass the whole safety envelop of a given Cyber-Physical System.  
However, the use of SafeSysE framework to perform an early safety analysis in the design process of a safety-
critical CPS will require some new developments in order to deal with embedded systems that may mix software and 
hardware components in a unique modeling, with mixed safety criticality. SafeSysE must also handle a new kind of 
requirements, related to the CPS cyber context. 
Furthermore, SafeSysE processes have to be adapted to better handle the variability of CPS topology. SafeSysE is 
also still under development in order to better deal with feed-back loops, redundancies and bi-directional flows 
between components. 
Acknowledments 
The authors wish to thank gratefully Christophe Frazza (DGA-TA, France) and Aline Aussedat (Supméca and 
DGA-TA, France) for their modeling and analysis work of the FCS scenario. DGA-TA (Direction Générale de 
l’Armement, Techniques Aéronautiques, France) mainly deals with aeronautic materials and systems behaviour and 
performances, and is responsible for their validation, qualification and certification. 
References 
1. Guérineau B, Bricogne M, Durupt A,  Rivest L. Mechatronics vs. Cyber Physical Systems: towards a conceptual framework for a suitable design 
methodology, IEEE MECATRONICS - REM 2016, Compiègne, France, June 15-17, 2016. 
2. Cressent R, David, Idasiak V, Kratz F. Designing the database for a reliability aware model-based system engineering process, Reliability 
Engineering & system Safety, vol. 111, pp 171-182, 2013. 
3. Kajdan R, Idasiak V. Model-based systems engineering and failure analysis: Experience feedback. Pages 1583-1590, proceedings of the 25th 
European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2015, Zürich; Safety and Reliability of Complex Engineered Systems – Podofillini et al. 
(Eds) © 2015 Taylor & Francis Group, London, ISBN 978-1-138-02879-1. 
4. Berres A, Schumann H, Spangenberg H. Concurrent safety analysis: A method for information exchange between systems and safety engineers. 
Pages 1455-1462, proceedings of the 25th European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2015, Zürich; Safety and Reliability of Complex 
Engineered Systems – Podofillini et al. (Eds) © 2015 Taylor & Francis Group, London, ISBN 978-1-138-02879-1. 
5. Mhenni F, Nguyen N, Choley J-Y. SafeSysE: A Safety Analysis Integration in Systems Engineering Approach. IEEE SYSTEMS JOURNAL, 
issue: 99, pages:1 – 12, ISSN :1932-8184, DOI:10.1109/JSYST.2016.2547460. 
6. Helle P, “Automatic SysML-based safety analysis”, in Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Model Based Architecting and 
Construction of Embedded Systems, 2012. 
7. Piriou P-Y, Faure J-M, Deleuze G. A Meta-model for Integrating Safety Concerns into Systems Engineering Processes. 7th Annual IEEE 
International Systems Conference, Apr. 2013, Orlando, United States, pp 298-304, 2013. 
8. Izosimov V, Levholt E. Mixed Criticality Metric for Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems on Multi-Core Architectures.4th MEDIAN 
workshop, 2015. 
9. Mhenni F, Choley J-Y, Nguyen N. Extended mechatronic systems architecture modeling with SysML for enhanced safety analysis; 2014/3/31, 
Systems Conference (SysCon), Ottawa, 2014,  8th Annual IEEE, pages 378-382, IEEE. DOI:10.1109/SysCon.2014.6819284 
